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Nonmedical Limits in Individual Life Insurance 
James B. Ross* and Shalini E. Perumpral t 
Abstract 
This paper shows data that illustrate the substantial variation among non-
medical schedules and the dramatic increase in their amount limits from 1972 
through 1992. Coefficients of variation are analyzed for several data subsets. 
We find that the variation of schedules in the sample of all firms has increased 
throughout the 1972-1992 period for issue ages up to 30, but has declined for 
issue ages beyond 30 during the 1982-1992 period. For the non-New York and 
stock companies our statistical tests indicate an increase in the variability of 
schedules over the full period 1972 to 1992. 
Key words and phrases: mortality, underwriting, medical examinations, sched-
ules, coefficient of variation 
Introduction 
The practice of granting life insurance without a medical examina-
tion began in England when underwriting evidence consisted of per-
sonal interviews, opinions of associates and friends, and/or attending 
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physicians' statements. Medical evidence began to be required in 1850, 
and a medical examination was considered essential until 1885. In 1886 
cautious experiments to remove the medical examination on smaller 
policies began, albeit with substantial restrictions that were gradually 
lifted in view of favorable results. 
The rationale for nonmedicallimits1 for insurance policies had been 
that the savings in medical exam expenses were sufficient to offset the 
additional mortality experienced in the absence of underwriting infor-
mation from medical exams. A shortage of medical examiners in rural 
areas following World War I led a group of Canadian companies to be-
gin nonmedical programs with restrictions on issue ages and amounts. 
The practice was well received in the field, the early experience was 
favorable, and the Canadian program was liberalized and expanded. 
Beginning in 1925 nonmedical underwriting spread rapidly through 
the American life insurance industry, and by 1935 86 percent of the 
129 members of the American Life Convention had adopted nonmedi-
cal programs. Today nearly every life insurer in the United States and 
Canada accepts some nonmedically underwritten business, and it is es-
timated that 67 percent of new ordinary policies and 33 percent of new 
ordinary amounts are written nonmedically (Black and Skipper, 1994, 
Chapter 24, p. 671). 
Because the insurer pays for medical evidence it uses in underwrit-
ing the application, there are initial expense savings when no medical 
examination is required. The actuarial mechanics of the construction of 
such schedules are well established: the present value over the policy 
life of the excess mortality experienced under nonmedical underwriting 
is equated to the expense savings at issue, and the equation is solved 
for the face amount that balances it. 
Nonmedical limit schedules theoretically should depend on the cost 
of medical exams and the additional mortality experienced in their ab-
sence, suggesting that the schedules for different companies should 
not vary much. In practice, however, variation among companies en-
ters via differing attitudes in areas such as mortality selection stan-
dards, persistency rates, returns on investments, target markets, de-
grees of accommodation to the writing agent, safety/profit margins in 
the premium structure, and stock versus mutual forms of insurer or-
ganization. This paper addresses questions raised by the existence of 
a large number of nonmedical limit schedules that exhibit substantial 
variation. 
1 A nonmedical limit for a new life insurance policy is the maximum amount of insur-
ance that can be issued without the benefit of a medical or paramedical examination. 
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Changes in nonmedical limits over the last two decades have been 
characterized in Black and Skipper (1994, Chapter 24, p. 672) as "non-
medical limits exploded." Great increases in nonmedical limits repre-
sent the responses by companies to large increases in the cost of med-
ical examinations over the period of this study. Companies have dealt 
with the cost increases in medical examinations by using less expensive 
paramedical exams and by making cost-effective use of blood and urine 
testing. 
The extent to which nonmedical limit schedules vary is an empirical 
question. This paper seeks to determine both the degree of the current 
variation and the trend in variation over time: Is competition driving the 
schedules together, or are individual company differences forcing them 
apart? We show how nonmedical limits have developed, summarize the 
current situation, and explore the variations of schedules of different 
insurers. 
2 Factors Impacting Nonmedical Limits 
While this paper focuses on nonmedical limits, there is a continuum 
of underwriting approaches of which medically examined business and 
nonmedical business are the extremes. All variations are driven by the 
trade-off between expense savings and differential mortality costs. This 
dynamic trade-off is a function of the increase in the cost-effectiveness 
of underwriting tools, increases in medical exam costs, and continu-
ing improvements in insured mortality. Paramedical underwriting pro-
vides the best example (Woodman, 1992). Paramedical underwriting 
has advanced to the point where separate mortality experiences are 
maintained for this approach. Blood and urine testing also offer pro-
tective values that are cost-effective at levels less than full nonmedical 
limits. Additionally, companies review periodically their use of other 
underwriting tools such as inspection reports, attending physicians' 
statements (APSs), personal health interviews (PHIs), and motor vehicle 
records (MVRs). These reviews may cause companies to revise the issue 
amounts at which they order such tools. 
Inflation is one of the major forces that drew attention to the non-
medical area. The chairman of an extended discussion in 1970 on the 
impact of inflation on underwriting remarked: "There is evidence that 
the cost of medical underwriting has increased more rapidly than the 
health care index, so we can conclude that the major components of 
underwriting costs have increased more rapidly than the Consumer 
Price Index" (Taylor 1970). The Statistical Abstracts of the United States 
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Price Index 1972-1982 1982-1992 1972-1992 
Consumer Prices 131% 45% 236% 
Medical Care 148% 106% 410% 
Physicians' Services 145% 94% 375% 
Average Policy Size Issued 168% 154% 580% 
provides the data for the percentage increases in related price indices 
shown below for the periods 1972-1982, 1982-1992, and 1972-1992. 
Data from the Life Insurance Fact Book show that the percentage in-
creases in the average size policy issued have more than kept pace with 
these inflationary increases in the several price indices. 
The onset of AIDS as a significant factor in underwriting occurred 
during the period 1982-1992. During this period AIDS dominated dis-
cussions of underwriting in the actuarialliterature.2 Company respon-
ses have included blood testing at much lower face amount levels in 
applicant cohorts where AIDS is a concern. Prior to 1985 blood testing 
generally was not requested until face amounts applied for exceeded 
$1 million. HIV / AIDS changed that dramatically. Blood/urine/saliva 
testing for HIV now begins at $25,000 to $100,000. Additionally, some 
observers feel that companies may have slowed increases in nonmedical 
limits and conformed their nonmedical schedules by issue ages to those 
of competitors to avoid being selected against by the HIV-infected. 
3 Literature Review 
This literature review concentrates on papers and discussions deal-
ing with the factors impacting nonmedical limits. Outside the actuarial 
literature there is substantial additional underwriting material relevant 
to this subject, particularly in the publications of the Home Office Life 
Underwriters Association and the Institute of Home Office Underwrit-
ers. 
2For the period up to December 31, 1991, during which information could affect 
company decisions on nonmedical limits for 1992, there were several papers and task 
force reports on AIDS (though not all focused on underwriting) that were published by 
the Society of Actuaries. These include the Guide for Practicing Actuaries (1988), Panjer 
(1989), Plumley (1989), Ramsay (1989 and 1990), the Report of the Society of Actuaries 
Committee on HW Research (1990), and the Report of the Task Force on the Financial 
Implications of AIDS (1990). 
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The literature contains three themes. The first theme consists of his-
torical examinations of nonmedical limits in ordinary (and industrial) 
life insurance. Parker (1921) reviews the Canadian experiment. Auden 
(1938) gives a brief history, an update on the practice of 114 companies, 
a review of the reasons for writing nonmedical business, and a report on 
the generally favorable mortality. Morton (1977) discusses nonmedical 
and paramedical underwriting in his review of underwriting principles 
and practices. Sankey (1990) and Black and Skipper (1994, Chapter 24, 
pp. 671-672) provide historic treatments for more recent periods. 
The second theme, review and liberalization, consists of a long series 
of discussions in the actuarial and underwriting journals responding to 
questions by editors. Smith (1924) emphasizes the early success of the 
Canadian nonmedical program. Larus (1925) cautions against compe-
tition on nonmedical limits, while Parker (1925) feels that companies 
doing a nonmedical business contribute meaningfully to the informa-
tion maintained by the Medical Impairment Bureau. 
As liberalizations develop, the discussions focus on nonmedical mor-
tality experience relative to that of medically examined business. Smith 
(1930) uses Canadian male select mortality as a benchmark; Shepherd 
(1930) benchmarks against American male select mortality. Both find 
the ratios of actual-to-expected mortality (AlE ratios) for nonmedical 
issues higher than the ratios for medically examined business; both 
find the AlE ratios for nonmedical issues in age groups beyond age 45 
substantially higher than their medically examined counterparts. Smith 
and Cross (1930) indicate higher lapse rates on the nonmedical issues. 
Marshall (1932) provides data showing the favorable mortality expe-
rience of Connecticut Mutual. Discussions in Record of the American 
Institute of Actuaries (1934) identify issue age 40 as the supportable up-
per age for nonmedical schedules, providing several examples at older 
issue ages of substantially higher AlE ratios (relative to American male 
select mortality) for nonmedical issues than for those medically exam-
ined. 
Auden (1938) cites reductions from upper age 45 to age 40 as the 
trend of the day, with nonmedical persistency still poor but nonmedical 
mortality satisfactory. He discusses the value of the forgone expense of 
the medical exam in offsetting additional mortality. Hunter (1940) in-
ventories mortality studies (up to 1931 for three Canadian companies 
and five American companies) and adds New York Ufe data through 
1939 to show generally favorable nonmedical experience. Discussions 
in Record of'the American Institute of Actuaries (1942) center around the 
problems of obtaining medical examiners during World War II and the 
nonmedical liberalizations that would help reduce the load on examin-
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ers (the consensus was "yes" to amounts, "no" to age extensions). The 
increase in the percentage of applications on a nonmedical basis that ac-
companied nonmedical schedule liberalizations is discussed, with one 
large company's percentage in 1942 going from 9 percent in July to 30 
percent in October! 
The central issue in Record of the American Institute of Actuaries 
(1946) is wartime mortality; all commentators on nonmedical limits 
come to the same general conclusion, viz. that nonmedical business 
still could be written satisfactorily at issue ages under 40 for amounts 
up to $5,000. The discussions in the Transactions of the Society of Actu-
aries (1950) indicate that the triggering incident for the announcement 
of nonmedical limit increases is a specific increase in medical examiner 
fees. 
Merriam (1951) describes an increase in medical examiner fees of 
about one-third, with resulting extensions of nonmedical limits in the 
Metropolitan Life to the age groups 41-45 and 46-50. Mathews (1953) 
provides survey evidence from 108 companies that such extensions 
are not common-only 5 percent of the companies issue nonmedically 
above age 40. Morton (1954) reports that most Canadian companies 
continu'e some nonmedical issue amount to age 45, but provides dis-
counted extra mortality costs that suggest only nominal amounts are 
feasible. Van Keuren (1956) indicates that Metropolitan Life, which in-
troduced nonmedical issues above age 40 in 1951, has discontinued 
them because of unsatisfactory mortality experience and the necessity 
to obtain medical exams on 25 percent of nonmedical applicants. 
Jacoby and Tookey (1959) both indicate pressure from physicians to 
increase the medical examination fees. They attribute this to doctors' 
aversion to paper work, the lagging of fees behind price levels, and 
resentment that insurers would attempt to fix doctors' fees. All discus-
sants (Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, 1960) note increases of 
$25,000 to $30,000 up to age 30, but few increases thereafter. 
Lew (1966) predicts increased use of bodily fluids testing to extend 
the use of nonmedical limits to older age groups. Gauer and van Keuren 
(1967) explore the use of technicians and early paramedical techniques. 
The difficulty of finding physicians willing to serve as medical exam-
iners is noted. Many discussants note the use of medical information 
phoned-in and recorded. Keltie (1969) attributes the slowdown in mor-
tality improvement on medically examined business to the spread of 
paramedical exams and alludes to reductions in the use of inspection 
reports and attending physicians' reports. 
The third theme consists of the readings gathered by the Society of 
Actuaries under the rubric of cost implications in the Professional Actu-
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arial Specialty Guide to Individual Underwriting (1993). Ormsby (1963) 
first examines the economics of underwriting in a paper that addresses 
the considerations involved in ordering inspection reports. He provides 
formulas for" ... converting changes in underwriting action attributable 
to information in the APS (attending physician's statement) into equiv-
alent 'net' single premiums at issue so that a comparison can be made 
of these 'net' single premiums with the total cost of obtaining and pro-
cessing the statement itself ... " The techniques outlined are applicable 
to the construction of nonmedical limit schedules. 
Mast (1978) discusses each element of the nonmedical limit ques-
tion. His paper determines the break-even amount as "... the pol-
icy size at which the increased mortality costs resulting from the lack 
of a medical examination are approximately counterbalanced by the 
consequent savings in underwriting expenses." He mentions an asset 
share approach, and discusses the net single premium technique used 
by Ormsby: " ... the relationship between the expenses associated with 
obtaining a medical examination and the present value of the increased 
mortality cost per $1,000 is used to determine the break-even amount." 
Reitano (1979) provides a consistent theory for evaluating the inter-
play between the cost of underwriting tools and the resulting mortality. 
He discusses two cases: 
• The actuarial approach typically used in setting nonmedical limits, 
using the present value of the difference between medical and 
nonmedical mortality experience (the two table technique); and 
• The underwriting approach for valuing underwriting tools (as in 
Ormsby), under which the value of the tool is the present value of 
the extra mortality costs that are saved by remOving certain lives 
from the standard issue class (the single table method). 
Bergstrom (1989,1991) discusses the assumptions and calculations 
that provide estimates for the protective values of blood chemistry pro-
file and urinalysis testing. The earlier study gives protective values 
for life insurance, the latter for major medical insurance. The reports 
show the techniques for expressing the results in terms of amount lev-
els above which the testing is cost-justified and in terms of return on 
the investment (ROI) in the testing. 
Mills (1991) provides a general model for such protective value stud-
ies, utilizing the axiom that" ... a particular underwriting procedure has 
positive economic value if its cost is less than the savings in mortality 
(or morbidity) made possible by its use." Mills provides an example for 
valuing the attending physician's statement in connection with disabil-
ity income. 
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Woodman (1992) assesses the value of the paramedical examina-
tion using the tools and approach specified by Bergstrom. He provides 
comparisons between medical, paramedical, and nonmedical mortality 
experience; his further analysis indicates the age-at-issue groups and 
amount ievels for which the several underwriting approaches are most 
appropriate. 
4 Data Sources 
The data used in the statistical analyses are the nonmedical limit 
amounts published in Best's Flitcraft Compend (Life-Health) for the edi-
tions dated 1973, 1983, and 1993. The data collection procedures used 
by A.M. Best Co. are such that the data relate to the years 1972, 1982, 
and 1992. It is these latter years that are used in the table headings and 
the text. 
The nonmedical limit information, when available, is given in the 
policy analysis section (preceding the statistical sections) of the Flitcraft 
Compend. The availability of nonmedical schedules is shown in Table 1, 
which gives in the panel headings the number of companies contribut-
ing nonmedical limit schedules to each year of the study. The material 
available for analysis grew substantially from 1972 to 1982, then shrank 
in 1992 because the A.M. Best Company split the Flitcraft Compendinto 
two sections, only one of which preserved the nonmedical data. As a 
result there are data on 113 companies for 1972, 164 companies for 
1982, and 119 companies for 1992. Forty-eight companies provided 
data for all three years. 
The basic data (not shown) consist of values for the nonmedical 
limits across each of the 15 issue age groups for each company plus 
additional values for independent variables representing specific char-
acteristics of individual companies. The issue age groups used by dif-
ferent life insurers in practice are so similar that less than 20 forcings 
were needed to put the nonmedical schedules into the common format 
of 15 groups by age at issue. 
Table 1 
Characteristics of the Sample of All Firms Nonmedical Limits (OOOs) 
Panel A: 1992 Sample (N = 119) 
Age at Issue 
Number of Companies* 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Mode 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Panel B: 1982 Sample (N = 164) 
Age at Issue 
Number of Companies* 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Mode 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Panel C: 1972 Sample (N = 113) 
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-3536-4041-4546-50 51-5556-60 61-6566-70 
115 115 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 115 107 52 36 18 10 
222 225 224 220 208 209 209 180 140 86.6 66.3 25.4 17.5 5.50 1.63 
153 155 137 138 134 134 134 99.8 89.2 65.1 65.3 53.6 50.1 18.3 7.42 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 150 100 75 50 0 0 0 0 
250 250 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 0 0 0 0 
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 500 500 350 350 350 350 100 50 
000000000000000 
0-4 5-14 
162 162 
134 139 
84.5 82.5 
100 100 
100 100 
500 500 
o 0 
15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-35 36-4041-4546-50 51-5556-60 61-6566-70 
163 164 164 164 164 162 162 150 82 37 22 16 10 
139 141 141 145 144 108 70.6 40.1 25.2 15.8 14.4 8.50 5.57 
81.3 81.0 80.9 86.4 86.9 85.2 82.5 75.4 75.9 72.2 72.3 47.5 42.4 
100 100 100 100 100 75 50 20 2 0 0 0 0 
100 100 100 100 100 100 50 25 0 0 0 0 0 
500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
o 15 15 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age at Issue 0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-35 36-40 41-4546-50 51-55 56-60 61-6566-70 
Number of Companies* 113 113 113 113 113 113 112 111 111 71 18 9 5 2 0 
Mean 30.2 31.9 32.7 33.0 33.1 32.9 32.0 20.9 11.0 3.31 0.50 0.15 0.07 0.02 0 
Standard Deviation 9.18 7.83 6.61 6.46 6.39 6.19 6.77 6.04 5.22 3.62 1.49 0.58 0.34 0.17 0 
Median 30 30 30 35 35 30 30 20 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 20 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 25 10 4 2.5 1.5 0 
Minimum 5 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* Number of companies with nonzero nonmedical limits 
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5 Methodology 
For each age group for each of the years 1972, 1982, and 1992 these 
univariate statistics for the nonmedical limits are calculated: mean, 
median, mode, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation. We also 
count and display the number of companies that provide nonzero non-
medical limits to a particular age group. These characteristics are dis-
played in Table 1. The same statistics are provided in Table 2 for the 
48 companies with data for all three years. 
Because our interest is to determine the extent of current variation 
among issuers and the trend in variation over time, a test for station-
arity of variance seems logical. Given the tremendous increase in non-
medical limits in the decade from 1972 to 1982, however, stationarity 
tests of the variance do not provide any insight as to the real diver-
gences in behavior within the industry. Therefore, coefficients of vari-
ation are calculated for each age group for the years 1972, 1982, and 
1992, and a series of nonparametric tests is performed on this statistic. 
Statistical tests are used to determine: (i) whether variation within 
the industry has remained consistent for the two decades-this test 
was suggested in 1937 by Friedman (1991); and (ii) whether the varia-
tion has consistently increased or decreased over the two decades-this 
test was suggested in 1963 by Page (1991). Appendix A describes these 
tests for the entire sample, giving the null and alternative hypotheses, 
the calculated coefficients of variation, formulas for the test statistics, 
and the cut-off points for rejection at selected confidence levels. The 
Friedman and Page tests are performed on the entire sample and re-
peated again for those 48 companies for which data are available for 
both decades. This approach allows us to isolate any bias that may have 
been introduced by outliers or new entrants into the full sample. 
The 48 firms for which data are available for 1972, 1982 and 1992 
are also split into stock (22) and mutual (26) companies and New York 
(22) and non-New York (26) insurers. Similar tests are performed on 
these samples to determine whether there are any identifiable differ-
ences in behavior among these subgroups. The stock/mutual split is 
chosen to explore whether the philosophy or practices inherent in the 
form of company organization may influence the nonmedical limits. 
The non-New York/New York split is chosen to test whether the New 
York expense and commission limitations (and perhaps the extraterri-
toriality) would impact the nonmedical limits. 
Table 2 
Characteristics of the Sample of 48 Firms Nonmedical Limits (OOOs) 
Panel A: 1992 Sample (N = 48) 
Age at Issue 
Number of Companies* 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Mode 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Panel B: 1982 Sample (N = 48) 
Age at Issue 
Number of Companies* 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Mode 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Panel C: 1972 Sample (N = 48) 
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70 
47 47 47 48 48 48 48 47 47 47 47 21 11 6 3 
253 259 261 264 252 252 252 204 149 83.5 66.4 29.1 21.5 7.04 1.63 
163 167 166 163 162 162 162 105 93.4 73.9 72.9 71.9 71.8 22.3 8.00 
250 250 250 250 250 250 250 200 100 50 50 0 0 0 0 
250 250 250 250 250 250 250 100 100 50 50 0 0 0 0 
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 500 500 350 350 350 350 100 50 
o 0 0 30 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-4 5-14 
48 48 
137 136 
70.0 68.3 
100 100 
100 100 
300 300 
30 30 
15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70 
48 48 48 48 48 47 47 42 16 6 2 2 2 
135 135 136 135 134 94.0 50.7 23.1 7.42 1.28 0.11 0.11 0.11 
65.1 65.1 64.9 64.3 65.0 60.3 40.0 24.2 18.0 4.43 0.72 0.72 0.72 
100 100 125 125 120 75 50 15 0 0 0 0 0 
100 100 100 100 100 100 50 10 0 0 0 0 0 
300 300 300 300 300 300 200 100 100 25 5 5 5 
30 30 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age at Issue 0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70 
Number of Companies* 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 27 3 2 1 1 0 
Mean 29.7 31.6 32.8 33.2 33.2 33.1 32.1 19.8 9.96 2.96 0.21 0.16 0.03 0.03 0 
Standard Deviation 9.31 7.52 5.92 5.60 5.60 5.61 6.09 5.62 3.43 3.20 0.92 0.69 0.22 0.22 0 
Median 30 30 30 35 35 30 30 20 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 20 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 40 25 12 5 4 1.5 1.5 0 
Minimum 10 10 15 20 20 20 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* Number of companies with nonzero nonmedical limits 
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6 Analysis and Findings 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 1 show the descriptive statistics for all 
firms for the set of 15 age groups over 1972-1992. The data show the 
stunning increases in nonmedical limits, particularly over 1972-1982. 
The mean is consistently higher than the median and the mode, with few 
exceptions, suggesting that some companies offer significantly larger 
nonmedical limits than their competitors. 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 show the descriptive statistics for the 48 
companies. The same patterns of skewness, with the mean being higher 
than the median and the mode, emerge for 1992 and 1982, while the 
1972 figures emulate a normal distribution. 
Table 3 shows the percentage increase in the mean nonmedical lim-
its for the periods 1972-1982, 1982-1992, and from 1972-1992. Per-
centage increases for 1972-1982 are substantial in every age category, 
especially beyond issue age 40. There are further increases in the mean 
nonmedical limits for every issue age category in the second decade. 
These increases are much smaller than those in the earlier decade but 
more evenly distributed along the age range. 
Table 4 shows that the percentage of companies offering nonzero 
nonmedical limits at issue ages beyond age 40 has risen dramatically 
since 1972. This may reflect the lower mortality rates due to improved 
health care and the reduction of death rates from diseases significant to 
the elderly. The percentage of companies offering nonzero nonmedical 
insurance to groups below the age of 15 dropped slightly. 
A comparison of the various coefficients of variation3 suggests that 
the differences among companies increased over both decades for the 
first seven age groups (0-30) in the total sample, particularly in the 
decade from 1972 to 1982 (Table 5). For the next five age groups (31-
55) the variation increased from 1972 to 1982, but the differences in 
nonmedical limits among companies decline markedly. For the last 
three age groups the variation among companies from 1972 to 1992 
consistently declined. Much of the reduction in variation at the older 
ages can be attributed to those companies which went from zero to pos-
itive nonmedical limits in that age range. The data further suggest that 
positive socioeconomic factors for the older age groups in the decade 
from 1982 to 1992 may have overridden any differences in individual 
company underwriting costs. The greater variability in practice for the 
lower age groups, however, suggests that company poliCies differ more 
in targeting this age group. 
3The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the (nonzero) 
mean. 
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Table 3 
Percentage Increases in Mean 
Non-Medical Limits: All Firms (in %) 
Age Range 1972-82 1982-92 1972-92 
0-4 347 66 640 
5-14 336 62 605 
15-15 325 61 585 
16-17 327 56 567 
18-20 326 48 528 
21-25 344 43 535 
26-30 353 44 553 
31-35 417 67 761 
36-40 545 97 1,173 
41-45 1,118 115 2,516 
46-50 4,980 161 13,160 
51-55 10,500 60 16,833 
56-60 21,186 17 24,900 
61-65 42,900 (36) 27,400 
66-70 00 (71) 00 
For the entire sample the null hypothesis that variation among firms 
did not change from decade to decade is rejected at the 5 percent level 
using Friedman's nonparametric test (Table 6). The alternate hypothe-
sis that the variation increased over time could neither be accepted nor 
rejected using Page's ordered test, while a second alternate hypothesis 
that the variation decreased over time failed to be accepted (Table 7). 
The analysis suggests that the divergent pattern in nonmedical limits 
for the younger age groups more than offsets the convergent patterns 
for the older age groups, but only to a small extent. There is no or-
dered pattern to this variation, however; neither the highest nor the 
lowest nonmedical limits fall in the same issue age category for the 
years 1972, 1982, and 1992. 
The results are similar when the tests are performed only on the 48 
firms for which data are available for both decades. The null hypothesis 
that variations among firms did not change from decade to decade fails 
to be rejected (Table 6 and Table 7). This is true even though the pattern 
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Table 4 
Percentage of Companies Offering 
Nonzero Nonmedical Privileges 
Age Percent Increase (in %) 
Range 1972 1982 1992 1972-82 1982-92 1972-92 
0-4 100.0 98.8 96.6 (1.2) (2.2) (3.4) 
5-14 100.0 98.8 96.6 (1.2) (2.2) (3.4) 
15-15 100.0 99.4 99.2 (0.6) (0.2) (0.8) 
16-17 100.0 100.0 99.2 0 (0.8) (0.8) 
18-20 100.0 100.0 99.2 0 (0.8) (0.8) 
21-25 100.0 100.0 99.2 0 (0.8) (0.8) 
26-30 99.1 100.0 99.2 0.9 (0.8) 0.1 
31-35 98.2 98.8 99.2 0.6 0.4 1.0 
36-40 98.2 98.8 99.2 0.6 0.4 1.0 
41-45 62.8 91.5 96.6 45.7 5.6 53.8 
46-50 15.9 50.0 89.9 214.5 79.8 465.4 
51-55 8.0 22.6 43.7 182.5 93.4 446.3 
56-60 4.4 13.4 30.3 204.5 126.1 588.6 
61-65 1.7 9.8 15.1 444.4 54.1 738.9 
66-70 0 6.1 8.4 00 37.7 00 
in the coefficient of variation for the first seven age groups shows an 
increasing variation over time. 
The null hypothesis fails to be rejected because there is a strong 
pattern of convergence in company practices in the age groups extend-
ing from 41 to 70. The increasing similarity in the behavior of these 
companies may have allowed other more independent firms to carve 
niches in these target markets, which would explain the ambivalence in 
the results for the entire sample. 
Sample: All Firms 
Age 0-4 5-14 
1992 69.02 69.17 
1982 63.00 59.59 
1972 30.43 24.54 
Sample: 48 FIrms 
Table 5 
Coefficients of Variation for All Age Groups 
15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
61.34 62.82 64.32 64.19 64.19 55.31 63.51 75.13 98.50211.04 286.21 332.91453.86 
58.35 57.51 57.35 59.38 60.10 78.89 116.88 188.10 300.59457.71 500.98 558.50762.51 
20.20 19.58 19.33 18.38 21.15 28.95 47.30 109.30 297.31 386.89 518.27 763.39 0 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 64.55 64.40 63.59 61.83 64.23 64.23 64.23 51.23 62.82 88.49 109.89247.35 334.40 316.56492.25 
1982 51.29 50.33 48.15 48.15 47.65 47.54 48.60 64.20 78.86 104.66 242.14345.96 631.64 631.64 631.64 
1972 31.35 23.83 18.03 16.86 16.86 16.95 18.97 28.40 34.47 108.35 442.35428.64 692.82692.82 0 
Sample: Mutual Companies - 26 Frrms 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 63.28 64.94 62.95 58.90 66.06 66.06 66.06 18.19 46.72 45.81 53.78 129.79 216.15 429.98509.90 
1982 44.72 45.03 45.03 45.03 45.03 74.42 45.98 65.86 57.50 90.57261.28269.03 509.90509.90 509.90 
1972 25.44 15.61 15.61 15.10 15.10 15.29 17.23 19.22 23.83 97.30355.62363.32 509.90509.90 0 
Sample: Stock Companies - 22 FIrms 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 56.21 56.21 53.23 54.73 53.23 53.23 53.23 54.95 77.74 102.65 133.59216.90267.07235.59409.65 
1982 60.07 56.91 52.80 52.80 51.54 51.54 52.15 65.28 97.72 119.65210.28431.80458.26458.26458.26 
1972 36.78 32.49 21.29 19.39 19.39 19.39 21.29 38.60 44.97 128.08 458.26458.26 0 0 0 
Sample: New York Companies - 22 Frrms 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 65.02 63.02 63.02 56.59 62.48 62.48 62.48 51.75 67.61 73.49 88.90 150.74 191.76248.84 342.88 
1982 54.97 56.56 52.83 52.83 52.83 52.94 54.77 75.99 79.04 104.48 218.55231.40 469.04 469.04 469.04 
1972 23.14 17.01 17.01 17.01 17.01 17.27 19.73 19.35 36.54 120.77325.86333.01 469.04 469.04 0 
Sample: Non-New York Companies - 26 Firms 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 49.92 49.92 48.78 51.20 52.47 52.47 52.47 49.53 60.06 93.39 124.77 236.58 331.10 340.63 500.00 
1982 46.45 43.44 43.44 43.44 42.71 42.71 42.97 48.82 80.75 97.89233.97500.00 500.00500.00 500.00 
1972 36.00 28.82 19.14 17.09 17.09 17.09 18.96 34.13 33.35 95.74500.00 500.00 0 0 0 
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Table 6 
The Friedman Test 
Friedman Test Test Indication on 
Sample Statistic 
All Firms 6.93 
48 Firms 2.53 
Mutual Companies (26) 3.63 
Stock Companies (22) 19.07 
New York Companies (22) 3.73 
Non-New York Companies (26) 11.03 
Note: Ho: tl = t2 = t3; 
HI: At least one of the tis is different. 
The 5% critical value is for this test is 5.99. 
Table 7 
The Page Test 
Sample 
All Firms 
48 Firms 
Mutual Companies (26) 
Stock Companies (22) 
New York Companies (22) 
Non-New York Companies (26) 
Note: Ho: tl = t2 = t3; 
HI: tl < t2 < t3; 
H2: tl > t2 > t3. 
Page Test 
Statistic 
HI: 190 
H2: 170 
HI: 187 
H2: 173 
HI: 188.5 
H 2: 171.5 
HI: 195 
H 2 : 170 
HI: 188 
H 2 : 170 
HI: 196 
H 2 : 164 
The 5% critical value is for this test is 190. 
Null at 5% Level 
Reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Reject 
Fail to reject 
Reject 
Test Indication on 
Null at 5% Level 
Unclear 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Reject 
Fail to reject 
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When the 48 firms are divided into New York carriers and non-New 
York insurers, the statistical tests provide interesting results. The tests 
indicate that the variation among New York carriers did not change 
over the two decades, while the null (no change) is strongly rejected 
for non-New York insurers (Table 6). Furthermore, Page's ordered test 
rejects the null in favor of the alternate that the variation among firms 
is increasing over time for the non-New York carriers (Table 7). The 
pattern in the coefficient of variation for the New York insurers remains 
similar to that for the sample of 48 firms. 
When the sample of 48 firms is split on the basis of organization 
into stock and mutual firms, we again find interesting differences. For 
the stock companies, the null hypothesis that the variation in company 
practices did not change over time is strongly rejected in favor of the 
alternate (Table 6). Furthermore, Page's test rejects the null in favor 
of the alternate that the variation in company practices is increasing 
over time (Table 7). These variations are preponderant in the issue age 
groups from 0 to 30. Although the pattern of increasingly divergent 
practices exists at the lower age groups for the mutual companies, there 
seems to be convergence at the higher age groups. As a result, Fried-
man's test fails to reject the null of no changes. This result is further 
confirmed by Page's test-the null fails to be rejected in favor of either 
increasing or decreasing divergence in mutual company practices over 
time. 
7 Conclusions 
This study examines nonmedical limits for a sample of life insurance 
companies over a 20 year period to determine the extent of variability in 
company practices at several points in time and the change in variability 
over time. The study shows a greater variability in company practices 
for the lower age groups than for higher age groups. Part of this vari-
ability could be attributed to the fact that almost all companies offer 
nonmedical insurance in the lower age brackets. The number of com-
panies offering nonmedical insurance at higher age brackets decreases 
sharply, particularly after age 50. 
Analysis of data over time shows that the percentage of companies 
offering insurance at the higher age brackets has risen while the per-
centage at lower age brackets has dropped slightly. The number of 
companies offering nonmedical insurance to those below age 45 in-
creased substantially in the first decade of our study, but decreased 
108 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1996 
slightly in the second decade. There is a continuous increase, however, 
in the number of firms offering nonmedical insurance at the higher age 
brackets. This fact could be attributed to improved mortality rates for 
the older population and to companies' increased interest in the senior 
citizen market. 
When the entire sample is examined, statistical tests suggest an in-
crease in variability of company nonmedical limit schedules. When the 
subs ample of 48 firms for which data are available over both decades 
is examined, however, there appears to be no substantive change in the 
variability of nonmedical limits. One possible explanation for these re-
sults is that new firms entering or leaving the market attempt to carve 
special niches that contribute to the greater variability in nonmedical 
limits. 
Interesting questions about nonmedical limits in practice abound. 
Do companies construct new nonmedical limit schedules analytically 
along the lines suggested earlier in this paper? Or do they forego such 
calculations and base their decisions in part on the schedules of other 
companies-particularly competitors? How do companies manage their 
agency operations with nonmedical limits less liberal than competitors? 
And where is the industry headed with respect to limits for nonmedical 
and paramedical acceptances and for blood/urine testing? Qualitative 
data are required to provide useful answers to these questions. Perhaps 
these data are best secured through a survey instrument addressed to 
the companies. The survey approach would have the additional ben-
efit of providing a larger sample by avoiding the data limitations that 
a source such as the Best's Flitcraft Compend (Life-Health) necessarily 
imposes. 
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Appendix 
The Friedman and Page statistics are explained below for the sam-
ple of all firms; for more details on these statistics see Hettmansperger 
(1991). They are nonparametric tests and are performed on the coeffi-
cient of variation for the sample of all firms and for all the subsamples. 
The first column of Table Al recognizes that there are 15 issue age 
groups in the sample. In the remaining three columns the values of 
the coefficient of variation (CV) and the respective ranking of each year 
based on the CVs are provided. A value of three is given to the year 
with the highest value of the CV, and the other years are rank-ordered 
accordingly for each age group. The years 1972, 1982, and 1992 are 
represented by tl. t2, and t3, respectively, in the tests below. 
For the Friedman test, the null hypothesis and the alternative hy-
pothesis are: 
Ho : tl = t2 = t3; 
HI : At least one of the tiS is different. 
The test statistic is: 
K* = 
12 k 
nk(k + 1) j~ (R.j)2 - 3n(k + 1) 
15 xl~ x 4 x [(22)2 + (36)2 + (32)2] - 3 x 15 x 4 
6.93 
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Table Al 
Coefficient of Variation 
And Rank (in parentheses) 
Age Year 
Group 1972 1982 1992 
1 30.4 (1) 63.0 (2) 69.0 (3) 
2 24.5 (1) 59.6 (2) 69.2 (3) 
3 20.2 (1) 58.3 (2) 61.3 (3) 
4 19.6 (1) 57.5 (2) 62.8 (3) 
5 19.3 (1) 57.3 (2) 64.3 (3) 
6 18.8 (1) 59.4 (2) 64.2 (3) 
7 21.1 (1) 60.1 (2) 64.2 (3) 
8 28.9 (1) 78.9 (3) 55.3 (2) 
9 47.3 (1) 116.9 (3) 63.5 (2) 
10 109.3 (2) 188.1 (3) 75.1 (1) 
11 297.3 (2) 300.6 (3) 98.5 (1) 
12 386.9 (2) 457.7 (3) 211.0 (1) 
13 518.3 (3) 501.0 (2) 286.2 (1) 
14 767.4 (3) 558.5 (2) 332.9 (1) 
15 0.0 (1) 762.5 (3) 453.9 (2) 
R· 
.J 22 36 32 
where k is the total number of years (k = 3); n is the number of issue 
age groups (n = 15); Rij is the rank of the i-th observation in year j 
relative to the other k - 1 years; and 
n 
R.j = L Rij j = 1,2, ... , k. 
j;l 
The calculated value of K* has a chi-square distribution with two 
degrees of freedom. The critical values at the 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels are 5.99 and 4.61, respectively. Thus, the hypothesis is rejected in 
favor of the alternative that the variations in the years 1972, 1982, and 
1992 are not the same. (The hypothesis, however, fails to be rejected 
at the 1 percent level.) 
Page's test for ordered alternatives asks whether the variable (in this 
case the coefficient of variation) is increasing over time or is decreasing 
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over time. The null hypothesis and the alternatives are: 
Ho : tl = t2 = t3; 
HI : tl < t2 < t3; 
H2: tI>t2>t3. 
The test statistic for HI is: 
k 
L L j x R.j 
j=I 
1 x 22 + 2 x 36 + 3 x 32 
190. 
The value of the test statistic is equal to the critical value of 190 at 
the 5 percent confidence level. Therefore the hypothesis is neither ac-
cepted nor rejected in favor of the alternative HI that the coefficient of 
variation is increasing over time. 
The test statistic for H2 is: 
k 
L L (k - j + 1) x R.j 
j=I 
3 x 22 + 2 x 36 + 1 x 32 
170. 
Because the calculated value of 170 is less than the critical value of 190, 
the hypothesis that the coefficient of variation remains constant over 
time fails to be rejected. 

